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1. Introduction 
Rainer Forst has developed a conception of moral and political justification that puts centre 
stage a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability.1 According to Forst, (i) moral and 
political normative claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability–or 
RGA, for short–while (ii) we, real agents, are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to 
justify our moral and political claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet 
RGA. This paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst construes a key element of 
RGA–i.e., the idea of “reciprocity of reasons” (Forst 2010, 719)–in terms that undermine 
both (i) and (ii). Before I elaborate further, let me sample three of the many respects in which 
RGA is central for Forst‟s view.  
First, RGA is at the heart of Forst‟s justification-centric view of practical reason. This 
view is constructivist in that it defines the justification, or validity, of moral and political 
normative claims as a function of their reciprocal and general acceptability (2017a, 1-18). 
Accordingly, for Forst, practical reason is a “capacity to respond to practical questions in 
appropriate ways with justifying reasons” (Forst 2012,18). And it is “the principle of reason” 
(Forst 2017a, 6; his emphasis) that salient claims be justifiable “in precisely the manner 
referred to by their validity claims” (ibid). Thus, “[p]ractically reasonable beings (…) „stand 
behind‟ their validity claims and duties of justification, that is, they are ready and able not 
only to provide adequate reasons, but also to make them the foundation of their actions” 
(ibid.). Yet the validity claims of moral and political claims are such that these claims must 
be justifiable on reciprocally and generally acceptable grounds (Forst 2010). Practical 
reasonableness hence involves a readiness and ability to comply with one‟s duty of 
justification to meet RGA. 
Second, RGA takes centre stage in Forst‟s substantive view of justice. For Forst, a 
political order is just only if it accords with principles that are justifiable to every affected 
person on reciprocally and generally acceptable grounds. Accordingly, only a “basic structure 
of justification” (Forst 2017a, 4) that complies with RGA–one that treats each citizen as 
“equal participants and normative authorities” of justification (Forst 2017a, 134, 6ff; 2015a, 
825, 2015b, 112)–can fully respect the basic right to justification of citizens. This, in turn, 
enables “fundamental” justice, political legitimacy, real democracy, or true non-domination 
(Forst 2012, 6, 213-216; 2017a, 4, 6f, 131-137). Forst conjectures that justifications that 
comply with RGA can establish as justified, or valid, rights to individual liberty and political 
participation, and rights to resources that enable or support the usage of these rights (Forst 
2012, 225f, 262). 
Third, RGA ties Forst‟s constructivism to his understanding of critical theory. Critical 
theory connects “reflection in philosophy and social science informed by an interest in 
emancipation” (Forst 2017a, 1). As such, it examines “orders and relations of justification” 
(ibid, 2)–or justification practices, for short–in light of a view of what justification practices 
should be like, given salient emancipatory aims. Critical theory hence takes it that “the first 
question of justice” is the question of “the justifiability of social relations and the distribution 
                                               
 
1 Forst draws on many sources, but two early influences continue to resonate in his work. These are 
Habermas‟s discourse ethics and Rawls‟s political liberalism: see Forst 1994, chapter 4, and Forst 2010. Forst 
aims to combine a Kantian form of moral constructivism with a Rawls-type political constructivism (although 
he more recently moves to a strong Kantian reading of Rawls‟s political liberalism: see Forst 2017b). For Forst, 
a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability is at the heart of both kinds of constructivism.   
2 
of the „power of justification‟ within a political context” (Forst 2012, 4f). But justification 
practice allocates to people a proper measure of such power only if it complies with RGA. 
Specifically, justification practice that complies with RGA accords each relevant agent a 
“qualified veto right” (Forst 2010, 719) in matters that relevantly affect the agent. This not 
only respects the agent‟s right to justification. It also protects, or helps to protect, the agent 
“from unjustified domination” (Forst 2001, 168f).2 This implicates a justification-centric 
view of (non-)domination. Domination here “means being disrespected in one‟s basic claim 
to be a free and equal normative authority [of justification] within the order one is subject to, 
and that implies the basic right to co-determine the structure of that society” (Forst 2016, 23). 
Accordingly, non-domination requires that exercises of power respect each affected person as 
a free and equal discursive authority. Yet, for Forst, to respect people accordingly involves 
respecting their qualified veto rights. RGA hence requires justification practices to accord 
relevant people a kind of discursive standing that aligns these practices with critical theory‟s 
emancipatory commitments.  
 In short, much here hinges on whether we can tell (individually or collectively, at least 
provisionally) whether salient claims are justifiable on reciprocally and generally acceptable 
grounds. After all, a standard, S, can hardly serve as a standard of justification, or validity, for 
actual agents if it is not within their genuine reach to identify whether salient claims meet S. 
Can we identify whether salient claims meet RGA? I argue that this is not so. For Forst, 
claims meet RGA only if they satisfy a requirement of reciprocity of reasons. On one reading 
of what this calls for, RGA must be rejected. On another, initially promising reading, RGA is 
viciously regressive. Either way, RGA cannot serve as a standard of justification, or validity, 
for engaged discursive practice and we, real people, are not under a duty to (be able to) 
justify ourselves to others on grounds that meet RGA.3 
This result has a positive upshot. It opens the door for conceptions of reciprocity and 
generality that draw on different ideas of the reasonable and that hence differ in content. It 
also complicates matters. It makes RGA‟s (putative) authority as a standard of justification 
dependent on whether RGA adopts a permissible, duly justifiable idea of the reasonable. It is 
open what idea of the reasonable may be adopted here. However, any idea that may come in 
must allocate to relevant people a due measure of discursive influence in justification, or 
discursive standing of high “discursive purchase”,4 that reconciles RGA‟s egalitarian 
commitments with its emancipatory aspirations. This calls for substantive considerations 
beyond RGA‟s purview. 
I proceed as follows. Sections 2 and 3 reconstruct RGA with a focus on reciprocity of 
reasons. Forst adopts a pro tanto promising version of RGA (referred to below as RGA-r) 
that requires justifications on “reasonably” non-rejectable grounds. Section 4 addresses 
Forst‟s view that people have a duty of justification to meet RGA-r. Section 5 shows that 
RGA-r is viciously regressive if it is understood in Forst‟s terms. Section 6 considers, and 
dismisses, attempts to save RGA-r from this problem. Section 7 argues that we do not have a 
duty of justification to meet RGA-r. Section 8 draws out implications of this result by 
elaborating on a particularly important respect in which RGA‟s content stands to be re-
                                               
 
2 See also Forst 2017a, 1-21, 37-51, 131-151; 2014, 178-181, 187-200; Forst 2016, 23f.  
3 Recent debate has seen sympathetic criticisms of Forst‟s account of reciprocity and generality: see 
Alan 2014, Laden 2014, Benhabib 2015, White 2015, Besch 2015, McGuire 2016, McNay 2020. These authors 
sympathize with the egalitarian and emancipatory aspirations that resonate in Forst‟s account, but argue that the 
requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability does not accomplish what Forst hopes it to accomplish. My 
discussion joins this chorus (though for reasons other than the ones advanced in these texts). And I pinpoint a 
respect in which that requirement needs revision to better serve such aspirations.  
4 See Besch 2019a, 471-473. 
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calibrated. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Reciprocity of reasons? 
As a first approximation, Forst‟s requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability takes a 
form like (for moral or political normative claims, φ): 
RGA φ is justified, or valid, if and only if φ is, or can be based on reasons that are, 
reciprocally and generally acceptable: φ must be equally acceptable 
(reciprocity) by all affected people (generality). (See Forst 2012, 214; 2010, 
711-740; 2014a.)  
RGA is more complex normatively than its linguistic surface suggests. As we shall see, φ 
counts as reciprocally and generally acceptable in RGA‟s sense just in case φ is, or can be, 
based on “reasonably” non-rejectable reasons. I turn to this in section 3, below. For now, let 
me take a look at RGA‟s notions of reciprocity and generality. As my focus is on reciprocity 
of reasons, I consider generality only briefly.  
Generality refers to the scope of RGA‟s constituency: φ is acceptable generally only if 
φ is acceptable by all agents who are, or would be, relevantly affected by φ, its adoption, or 
its implementation. Forst leaves open how or on what grounds we may determine who counts 
as a “relevantly” affected agent, and hence, how or on what grounds we can delineate RGA‟s 
scope of inclusion.5 As I shall not take issue with this idea, however, I will now set it aside.  
Turning next to RGA‟s notion of reciprocity, then, Stefan Gosepath puts its upshot 
thus: “[o]nly that which is equally acceptable to everyone can be regarded as justified” 
(Gosepath 2015, 133). Forst himself tells us: 
To be able to distinguish “acceptable” from “unacceptable” reasons, two criteria are 
required: reciprocity and generality. First, reasons that justify specific normative 
claims must be reciprocally non-rejectable, that is, the author of these claims may not 
demand any rights or privileges that he or she denies his or her addressee. Moreover, 
the author may not project her own opinions, interests or values onto others and thus 
decide for him- or herself, rather than reciprocally, how to fulfil the criterion of 
reciprocity. The same is the case for the addressee of the claims. (Forst 2012, 214.)  
Reciprocity means that no one may make a normative claim (…) he or she denies to 
others (call that reciprocity of content) and that no one may simply project one‟s own 
perspective, values, interests, or needs onto others such that one claims to speak in 
their “true” interests or in the name of some truth beyond mutual justification 
(reciprocity of reasons). (Forst 2010, 719.)  
Reciprocal acceptability calls for reciprocity of content and of reasons. What does this mean? 
Reciprocity of content is relatively straightforward. Roughly, it requires claimants to treat 
like cases alike, and hence calls for a kind of (formal) impartiality. Let me set this aside as 
unproblematic. 
Reciprocity of reasons is harder to pin down.6 To bring out the contours of this idea, I 
start by considering what the first of the above two passages tries to do. Forst elaborates on 
the kind of acceptability that RGA calls for. To this end, he draws on a contrast between 
deliberative resources–e.g., interests, needs, views, volitions, capacities, and so on–that an 
agent actually has and resources that others (unduly, mistakenly) attribute to her. He suggests 
that for φ to be “reciprocally acceptable” by an agent, she must be able to accept φ in light of 
                                               
 
5 On Forst‟s account of the scope of reciprocity and generality: see Erman 2014. 
6 As Benhabib notes, see Benhabib 2015, 782f.  
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deliberative resources that she actually has. This suggests an actualist version of RGA: 
RGA-a  φ is justified, or valid, if and only if φ is, or can be based on reasons that are, 
reciprocally and generally acceptable: φ must be equally acceptable by all 
affected people from their actual perspective, or in light of their actual 
interests, needs, views, volitions, and so forth.  
Forst‟s writings often support an actualist interpretation of RGA, and many commentators 
read him in such terms. It is hence useful to highlight why we should not read RGA in 
actualist terms, if other terms are available (as, fortunately, they are: see next section). I start 
with a note on the (alleged) emancipatory or protective function of justifications that comply 
with RGA–a feature that seems to sit especially well with an actualist reading of RGA. 
For Forst, RGA requires that agents be accorded a strong form of discursive standing–
or a “high-purchase” form of discursive respect (Besch 2014 and 2019a, b). Justification 
practice that complies with RGA construes equal acceptability by actual agents as justifying. 
It hence situates them not as mere recipients, but as “equal participants and normative 
authorities” of justification (Forst 2017a, 134, 6ff; 2015a, 825; 2015b, 112). For Forst, this 
involves that agents be accorded a “qualified veto-right” that protects, or helps to protect, 
them from “unjustified domination” (Forst 2001, 168f. and 2010, 719). It is only on the 
assumption that agents can make meaningful use of these veto-rights that Forst attributes to 
reciprocal and general justification an emancipatory or protective function. And it is on the 
assumption that such justification has this function that he takes a “basic structure” or 
reciprocal and general justification to enable many important things–such as proper respect 
for people‟s right to justification, fundamental justice, legitimacy, democracy, or political 
non-domination (Forst 2017a, 6f, 131-137).7  
Now, to enable the emancipatory or protective function of reciprocal and general 
justification, Forst-type veto-rights must be relevantly accessible and authentic. Specifically, 
agents must be able to carry out what counts as a qualified, authoritative exercise of such 
rights (accessibility). And the authoritative exercise of these rights must relevantly track, or 
not distort, the agent‟s perspective (authenticity). E.g., if justification recognizes rejections as 
authoritative exercises of Forst-type veto rights only if they are ideally rational, average 
agents may be unable to authoritatively exercise them. And if their authoritative exercise asks 
agents to bracket, deny, or idealize away, commitments that they actually cannot detach from, 
they may be unable to make any meaningful use of these rights.8 
Plainly, RGA-a is geared toward the desiderata of accessibility and authenticity (if 
these things are desiderata). This is so at least if we assume, in accordance with RGA-a‟s 
spirit, that an agent‟s rejection of φ counts as an authoritative exercise of a Forst-type veto-
right if she cannot coherently accept φ from her actual perspective, or in light of her actual 
deliberative resources. Accordingly, Forst‟s writings suggest an actualist interpretation of 
                                               
 
7 This simplifies: there are two readings of Forst-type veto rights. On a weak reading, their authoritative 
exercise is conditioned by justification. E.g., no rejection of φ can be an authoritative exercise of a veto right if φ 
is justified. On a strong reading, the authoritative exercise of these rights conditions justification. φ here cannot 
count as justified if Betty rejects φ in a manner that authoritatively exercises her veto right. I adopt a strong 
reading. It sits better with Forst‟s view that reciprocal and general justification situates agents as authorities of 
justification. And it is foregrounded in his more recent work: see Forst 2017a, 1-21, 37-51, 131-151; Forst 
2014a, 178-181, 187-200. 
8 I elaborate on accessibility and authenticity as components of an agent‟s normative influence in 
justification in Besch 2019a. One question that arises here is how low or high the idealization value of standards 
of acceptability-based justification must be in order to ensure that relevant levels of discursive influence: see 
Besch 2019b. See also section 8, below.   
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RGA especially where he foregrounds the (putative) emancipatory or protective function of 
reciprocal and general justification. 
 However, if the requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability takes the form of 
RGA-a, then it is a non-starter. RGA-a is inadequate as a standard of justification, or validity. 
Consider a principle that prohibits marital rape. If this requirement filters out such a principle 
as invalid, it cannot serve in the role of a standard of justification. But RGA-a would filter out 
this principle as invalid. As a matter of fact, some husbands are committed rapists: they take 
it to be their role prerogative as husbands to force their spouses to have sex. Hence, some 
relevant agents cannot actually accept the principle in light of their actual deliberative 
resources. Thus, the principle violates RGA-a. A principle that permits marital rape would 
fare no different. You and I would be unable to accept the principle. Hence, marital rape 
would neither be prohibited nor permitted. As Uwe Steinhoff observes, similar results would 
follow for all relevantly contested normative content (Steinhoff 2015, 168). The general point 
is familiar and not specific for RGA-a: inclusive actualist “equal acceptability” justification 
leads to incoherence or anomy (Enoch 2015, 117f).9 
 
3. Hypotheticalized reciprocity of reasons?  
There is more to RGA than RGA-a. Forst sometimes conceptualizes RGA in terms that call 
for hypotheticalized non-rejectability:  
The defining feature of reasons that can justify moral claims is thus that they must be 
reasons that cannot be reasonably–that is, not reciprocally and generally–rejected. 
As such, they justify norms–and corresponding actions–that possess a morally 
unconditional normative character and are in a strict sense categorically binding as 
norms against whose validity no good reason can speak. (…) This definition is 
stronger than the equally applicable but insufficient formulation that moral reasons 
must be “intersubjective,” “comprehensible,” “acceptable,” “public,” or “agent-
neutral.” It conforms to the idea that such reasons must be “shared” reasons, but 
accentuates the modal specification, that they must be sharable, in order to do justice 
to the openness of the procedure of justification and to underscore the (in this sense 
counterfactual) moment of reciprocal and general acceptability–or better, 
nonrejectability–independent of the factual acceptance or nonacceptance of reasons. 
(Forst 2012, 21; the emphasis is Forst‟s.)  
This oscillates between an acceptance-focused and a rejection-focused reading of RGA, but 
Forst often prefers the latter. If we recall that RGA applies not only to moral claims, a 
reasonable non-rejectability version of RGA is suggested: 
RGA-r  φ is justified, or valid, if and only if φ can be based on reasons “that cannot 
be reasonably–that is not reciprocally and generally–rejected.”  
According to RGA-r, what contributes to φ‟s justification status is not that relevant people 
can (cannot) accept φ in light of their actual deliberative resources. Rather, what contributes 
to φ‟s justification status is that φ can (cannot) be based on, or be accepted for, reasons that 
relevant people cannot reject reasonably.  
RGA-r seems promising. RGA-r accommodates a need all standards of acceptability-
based justification must accommodate. Acceptability can count toward justification only if it 
is, or counts as, suitably respectable, or authoritative. Thus, all standards of acceptability-
                                               
 
9 Of course, if standards of justification, where they entail incoherence or anomy results, are incomplete, 
we might also say that inclusive actualist “equal acceptability” justification leads to incompleteness (see Gaus 
1996, 151-158). 
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based justification must somehow qualify the kind of acceptability that they construe as 
authoritative, or as positively contributing to justification. As RGA-r makes explicit, then, 
Forst‟s requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability adopts an idea of reasonableness 
in the role of a bar for (or criterion of) authoritativeness.  
Next, building RGA on an idea of reasonableness can help to avoid incoherence or 
anomy results if the bar for reasonableness is put at a suitably demanding level. Of course, 
the more demanding that bar is relative to the deliberative resources of relevant claimants, the 
greater will be its tendency to attract controversies in its own right. This can put standards of 
justification that build on such bars in need of justification. And it is not obvious on what 
grounds or by what standards the justifications called for here could proceed. Still, in relation 
to incoherence or anomy results, RGA-r is potentially superior to RGA-a.  
Finally, RGA-r hypotheticalizes, or idealizes (in one sense of the word).10 But RGA-r 
still allows for accessibility and authenticity if its bar for reasonableness is defined in suitably 
accessible terms. Accessibility and authenticity come in degrees, and reasonableness can be 
construed in more or less demanding terms. Accordingly, the bar for a reasonable exercise of 
Forst-type veto-rights can be placed at low enough levels to ensure that agents can meet that 
bar and that “reasonable” exercises of these rights can track their actual voices. Of course, the 
bar would still have to be set high enough to avoid incoherence or anomy. It is not obvious 
what this calls for. Still, that RGA-r hypotheticalizes is compatible with accessibility and 
authenticity.  
Assuming, then, that RGA takes the form of RGA-r, Forst effectively premises RGA 
on two additional views. First, he construes the authoritativeness of acceptability (or non-
rejectability) in the following terms:  
F1 φ must be justifiable by reasons that no affected agent can reject reasonably. 
Now, reasonable non-rejectability requirements like F1 are indeterminate so long as the idea 
of the reasonable they implicate remains unspecified. Thus: when are reasons “reasonably” 
non-rejectable in RGA-r‟s sense?  
Unfortunately, Forst does not provide much in the way of an account of what makes 
normative claims “reasonably” non-rejectable. But a passage quoted earlier provides a clue. 
Here is it again (in shorted form): 
The defining feature of reasons that can justify moral claims is thus that they must be 
reasons that cannot be reasonably–that is, not reciprocally and generally–rejected. 
(…) This definition (…) conforms to the idea that such reasons must be “shared” 
reasons, but accentuates the modal specification, that they must be sharable, in order 
to (...) underscore the (…) moment of reciprocal and general acceptability–or better, 
nonrejectability. (Forst 2012, 21; the first and last emphases are added.)  
The defining feature of reasons that justify relevant claims is that they are “reasons that 
cannot be reasonably–that is, not reciprocally and generally–rejected.” We may read the 
phrase between the dashes as specifying the phrase that it is embedded in. This is equally 
plain in the German original. Forst writes there that the defining feature of the relevant 
reasons is “dass dies nicht vernünftigerweise – d.h. nicht reziprok-allgemein – 
zurückweisbare Gründe sein müssen” (Forst 2007, 36). “D.h. ” abbreviates “das heisst,” 
which translates as “this means,” or “that is to say.” Thus, Forst tells us: the relevant reasons 
must be reasons that cannot be “reasonably” rejected and that is to say that they are reasons 
that cannot be “reciprocally and generally” rejected. This assumes that when (i), below, is 
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true, then so is (ii) (for a relevant kind of reason, R): 
(i) R cannot be “reasonably” rejected, 
(ii) R cannot be “reciprocally and generally” rejected. 
Textual evidence suggests that Forst takes (ii) to define the meaning of (i). To elaborate on 
his usage of the phrase “reasonably non-rejectable,” Forst stresses that while he takes the 
phrase from Scanlon, he “interpret[s]” it with his own criteria of reciprocity and generality in 
order to “more precisely define the meaning of “reasonable” than Scanlon did” (Forst 2012, 
21, n. 38, and 272; the emphasis is added).11 This is in play when Forst more recently writes: 
“Adapting Thomas Scanlon‟s formulation (“not reasonable to reject”), I believe that moral 
justification requires that norms must rest on reasons that are not reciprocally and generally 
rejectable.” (Forst 2017, 28f.) This suggests: 
F2  Reasons that cannot be rejected “reasonably” are reasons that cannot be 
rejected “reciprocally and generally,” i.e., in a manner that meets the 
requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability. 
We just encountered textual evidence that Forst not only adopts F2, but also takes F2 to 
register what defines the meaning of claims like “Reason R is reasonably non-rejectable.” My 
subsequent argument does not hinge on this further view. I shall simply assume that Forst 
adopts F2 so that, in his framework, reasons are not “reasonably” non-rejectable unless they 
are “reciprocally and generally” non-rejectable. 
 Some comments are in place. First, we saw earlier that standards of acceptability-based 
justification must qualify the kind of acceptability that they construe as authoritative, or as 
contributing to justification. Over the years, Forst grappled with the issue–which reflects in 
RGA‟s ambiguity between RGA-a and RGA-r. Since his early work on the theme, he 
construes “moral” (as opposed to more limited, “ethical”)12 justifications in strong 
universalist terms as requiring justifiers, or reasons, that are reciprocally acceptable as 
justifiers, or as reasons, by all affected others: reasons, he insists, are “good moral reasons” 
only if they themselves meet the criteria of reciprocity and generality, while no “conviction” 
that does not meet this test can raise moral validity claims (Forst 2002, 39).13 This presents 
Forst with the challenge to adopt authoritativeness constraints on the acceptability of 
justifiers, or reasons, that, without undermining his constructivism, allow him to remain 
faithful to his universalist aspirations and to avoid idealizations that undermine the (putative) 
emancipatory or protective role of moral justification. This is where he reaches for F2. He 
looks to Scanlon for a reasonableness constraint on the acceptability of justifiers that actual 
people can actually meet. But he then interprets this constraint in light of his view that 
justifiers provide “moral” justification only if they meet the requirement of reciprocity and 
generality. And so “reasonable” non-rejectability becomes “reciprocally and generally” non-
rejectability. 
Yet, second, F2 is problematic. If claims satisfy RGA-r only if they can be based on 
reasons that are “reasonably” non-rejectable, but reasons are “reasonably” non-rejectable 
only if they are “reciprocally and generally” non-rejectable, i.e., in a manner that satisfies 
RGA-r, something seems amiss. Forst seems to construe a practice that abides by F2 as a 
reflexive practice of reason-giving in which all normative claims–including claims like “φ is 
(not) reasonably non-rejectable”–can at any time be called into question and may be upheld 
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12 See Forst 2012, 62-78. 
13 The German version of the text quoted from here is Forst (1994). 
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only if they meet the requirement of reciprocity and generality. But if we adhere to RGA-r 
and interpret it in terms of F2, we can never tell whether normative claims pass that test (see 
sections 5 and 6).  
Hence, third, it is worth highlighting that the conjunct of RGA-r and F1 by itself does 
not commit us to F2. We can accept RGA-r and adopt a reasonable non-rejectability view of 
reciprocal and general acceptability, while we reject the claim that “reasonably” non-
rejectable reasons must be “reciprocally and generally” non-rejectable reasons. As I argue 
below, this is what we should do if we wish to adopt RGA-r and F1. And this would open up 
space to engage on substantive grounds–e.g., grounds that elevate the importance of the 
emancipatory or protective role of moral justification–what reasonableness constraint, if any, 
acceptability-based justification should adopt (see section 8). (Readers who wish to deny that 
Forst adopts F2 are free to read the following discussion in conditional terms: the argument is 
that if Forst adopts F2, then his view runs into problems, so that he has reason not to adopt F2 
and to embrace the advocated conclusion.) 
 
4. A duty of justification? 
Can RGA-r serve as a standard of justification in engaged discursive practice? Do we have a 
duty of justification to meet RGA-r? I turn to this in section 5. For now, I confirm that Forst 
attributes to us such a duty and address two concerns that arise here.  
To start with, for Forst, the requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability is to 
apply to discursive practice from the inside, or from the first person perspective of 
normatively engaged participants. For Forst, “the only perspective to which we have access is 
that of a participant, not one of a trans-historical observer” of practices or reason giving or 
justification (Forst 2017a, 6). It is as discursively engaged participants that we have an 
“unconditional duty” (Forst 2012, 21) to justify, or be able to justify, ourselves to others in 
accordance with a reasonably non-rejectable “principle of justification” (Forst 2012, 18)–
Forst calls it “the principle of reason” (Forst 2017a, 6; the emphasis is Forst‟s)–according to 
which all claims must be “justified in precisely the manner referred to by their validity 
claims” (Forst 2012, 18, 21, 27, 66f, 249, 259 and 2017a, 3f). Given Forst‟s view that moral 
or political claims raise validity claims such that these claims depend for their justification, or 
validity, on their reciprocal and general acceptability,14 he thereby attributes to us a duty to 
justify, or be able to justify, ourselves, or salient claims of ours, to others on grounds that 
meet RGA-r.  
Moreover, Forst claims that we take ourselves and others can access and navigate “an 
intersubjective space of justifying reasons” (Forst 2012, 27)–a capacity that we exercise by 
justifying our claims to others on grounds that meet RGA-r. Writes Forst: 
If one does not make this assumption, it would be a form of disrespect: one would not 
be respecting the other as an autonomous moral person if one did not expect her to be 
able to justify her actions with reasons that cannot be reciprocally and generally 
rejected, with reasons that are intersubjectively available. One would then be viewing 
the other primarily as an object of explanation, not as a subject of justification. (Forst 
2012, 18f.)  
Thus, we have a duty to (be able to) justify ourselves to others in accordance with RGA-r; 
and we take each other to be able to meet this duty.  
It is helpful to contrast Forst‟s view of a duty of justification with other possible 
views. We might think of such a duty in various ways, e.g., as 
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1.  a duty that salient claims be justifiable (call this a duty of justification in the 
widest sense: the duty leaves open what justifiability requires);  
2.  a duty that salient claims be justifiable to others (call this an interpersonal 
wide duty of justification: it requires interpersonal justifiability, but leaves 
open what this calls for);  
3.  a duty that salient claims be justifiable to others on grounds that are 
reasonably non-rejectable (call this as an interpersonal strong duty of 
justification: it requires interpersonal justifiability on grounds that meet the 
demanding, or strong, condition of being “reasonably non-rejectable”); 
4.  a duty that salient claims be justifiable to others on grounds that are 
reasonably non-rejectable in RGA-r’s sense (call this as a interpersonal 
narrow duty of justification: it requires interpersonal justifiability on 
grounds that are “reasonably non-rejectable” specifically, or narrowly, in 
RGA-r‟s sense).  
Forst‟s duty of justification is a duty of type-(4)-justification. Moreover, Forst often refers to 
this duty in terms such that it requires for its fulfilment performances of justification, or 
actual reason giving. Two concerns arise.  
First, it is doubtful that a reasonably non-rejectable duty of justification can take the 
form of a duty of type-(4)-justification. Other things being equal, any duty of justification the 
content of which is given by, or depends on, a contested conception, or doctrine, of moral or 
political justification–say, any doctrine-dependent duty of justification–is likely to be as 
contested as the doctrine that supplies its content. Hence, if a duty of justification is to be 
reasonably non-rejectable, there are reasons to construe in doctrinally neutral terms–terms 
that abstract from, and are neutral toward, conceptions of justification that reasonable people 
reasonably disagree about.15 But a Forst-type duty of justification is not neutral in this sense. 
It is indexed to a reasonably contested, constructivist view of justification.16 
Second, any performance duty of justification is at least morally conditioned in 
application, and trivially so. Reason giving is activity. But what course of action is morally 
called for in a given situation depends on what is morally at stake in that situation. E.g., if 
your choice is between saving lives and giving reasons, you should save lives. The point: it 
can be unreasonable not to give others reasons only if there is opportunity to do so and 
trumping countervailing considerations are absent.  
And even if circumstances otherwise allow for it, reason giving is not always a proper 
response to discursive challenges. As Aristotle notes,  
[y]ou ought not to discuss with everybody (...) for with some people argument is sure 
to deteriorate; for with a man who appears to try every means to escape from the right 
[conclusion] you are justified in trying everything to come to such a conclusion; 
however, this is not a seemly proceeding (...). [It] can only result in a debased kind of 
discussion.17 
It is not unreasonable for us not to give reasons if others are culpably unwilling to be duly 
                                               
 
15 This uses O‟Neill‟s notion of abstraction: see O‟Neill 1996, 38-44, and 1988a. One upshot of 
abstraction in this sense is that if a claim α is abstracted from two conflicting claims, β and γ, then β and γ each 
entail α, while α does not commit to β or to γ, and hence is neutral between them.  
16 I assume throughout that anti-constructivism can be reasonable, and that RGA is the subject of 
reasonable disagreement: see Besch 2015.  
17 This is Postema‟s translation of Topics 164b8-14; see Postema 1995, 356.  
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responsive to relevant discursive efforts of ours. Another salient situation type concerns 
unreasonable rejection grounds. Where rejections are based on such grounds, they do not, or 
not always, put reasonable views in need of justification. And in such cases it is not, or not 
always, unreasonable not to respond to rejections by giving reasons (e.g., consider openly 
racist denials of the view that everyone is owed moral concern). And there are many other 
situation types in which it is not unreasonable not to respond to discursive challenges with 
reason giving. 
What to make of this? We can set aside the second concern. On a charitable reading, a 
duty of type-(4)-justification requires justifiability and calls for performances of justification 
only if suitable conditions obtain. This is plausible, and it is how I read Forst here. 
The first concern raises deeper issues. One reply is this. Yes, a duty of type-(4)-
justification is reasonably contested. But we can have this duty even if the claim that we do is 
not equally acceptable by all relevant people. And while this reply seems plausible, it seems 
unavailable for Forst. Note first that he often applies RGA to all normative claims (Forst 
2015, 214; 2017a, 1-36). Yet the claim that we have a duty of type-(4)-justification is a 
normative claim. Thus, this claim, too, would depend for its justification, or validity, on its 
reciprocal and general acceptability. Now, Forst also assumes that if there is reasonable 
disagreement about φ, then φ is not reciprocally acceptable by the people who reasonably 
disagree about φ.18 But there is reasonable disagreement about the claim that we have a duty 
to type-(4)-justification. Hence, this claim would not be justified, or valid. Finally, in Forst‟s 
constructivist framework, if “We ought to φ” is not valid, then it is not the case that we ought 
to φ. Thus, we would not have a duty to type-(4)-justification. 
Various rejoinders are possible. E.g., maybe the claim that we have a duty of type-(4)-
justification need not be reciprocally and generally acceptable; or maybe disagreement about 
this claim is not reasonable, or does not rule out the claim‟s reciprocal and general 
acceptability; or maybe a duty of type-(4)-justification applies to us even if the claim that it 
does is not valid in RGA‟s sense. However, none of this sits well with Forst‟s constructivism. 
But let us set this aside and take away just two things. It is doubtful that a reasonably non-
rejectable duty of justification takes the form of a duty to type-(4)-justification. And a duty of 
justification, if we have one, primarily requires justifiability.  
 
5. RGA-r: a regress problem 
Can RGA-r serve as a requirement of justification, or validity, in engaged discursive 
practice? I shall now suggest that this is not so.   
Suppose that you try to find out whether a given normative claim (or view, opinion) 
of yours, φ1, is justifiable, or valid, in RGA‟s sense. This task is more complex than it might 
initially seem. RGA does not take the actualist form of RGA-a, but the hypotheticalized form 
of RGA-r. Accordingly, it is not enough for you to determine whether there are relevant 
people who can or cannot actually reject φ1, or who can, could, or are committed to, reject 
φ1 on grounds that, by their lights or by yours, are plausible, respectable, good, or 
compelling. Instead, you must determine whether φ1 can be based on, or be accepted for, 
reasons that are “reasonably” non-rejectable. And these reasons must be “reasonably” non-
rejectable in not just any sense of the notion, but in F2’s sense: they must be reciprocally and 
generally non-rejectable. Thus, what must you do in order to determine whether φ1 can be 
based on, or be accepted for, such reasons?  
Unfortunately, Forst is not helpful here. He refers to reasons as reciprocally and 
                                               
 
18 Forst puts this view to important use in his account of the criterion of respect toleration: see Forst 
2003a; 2003b, 588-649.  
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generally non-rejectable, but he does not explain what this says about them–other than that 
these reasons cannot be rejected on grounds that meet RGA-r. But if this is what we must go 
by–as apparently we must–problems loom. Why?  
Recall first that you are trying to determine whether φ1 can be based on, or be 
accepted for, reasons that are “reasonably” non-rejectable in F2‟s sense. Let “φ2” refer to an 
actual or possible candidate reason that you are tempted to bring in here. For instance, φ2 
might be persuasive from your perspective, or respectable peers of yours might report that 
they accept φ1 on grounds of φ2. What you need to determine, then, is whether the normative 
claim “φ2 is a reason for φ1” can be rejected on the basis of reasons that meet RGA.  
Of course, by itself, it makes good sense to examine whether there are good reasons to 
reject the normative claim “φ2 is a reason for φ1”–for brevity‟s sake, let me refer to this 
claim as “φ3.” One salient issue here is whether there are relevant normative considerations 
that undercut φ2‟s role as a reason for φ1. And, it would seem, it is plausible to claim that 
normative considerations can serve as such undercutters only if these considerations 
themselves are authoritative in some salient sense. And for Forst, this requires that they meet 
RGA-r.  
But then things get murky. For what you need to do now is to determine whether φ3 
can be rejected on grounds that meet RGA-r. As before: to determine this, it is not enough to 
find out whether there are relevant people who can, could, or are committed to, reject φ3 for 
reasons that, by your lights or by theirs, are plausible, respectable, good, or compelling. No 
actual or possible rejection of φ3 counts toward your task unless it can be based on reasons 
that meet RGA-r. Let “φ4” refer to a candidate reason to reject φ3. Your question hence 
becomes whether φ4 is a rejection reason that meets RGA-r.  
Again, to answer this question, you must determine whether the claim “φ4 is a reason 
to reject φ3” can be rejected on the basis of reasons that meet RGA-r. And this leaves you in 
the same doxastic predicament that you were in when you considered φ3. Refer to the claim 
“φ4 is a reason to reject φ3” as “φ5” and let “φ6” refer to a candidate reason to reject φ5. 
Accordingly, you now need to determine whether the normative claim “φ6 is a reason to 
reject φ5” can be rejected on grounds that meet RGA-r. And at least as far as RGA-r is 
concerned, you may not stop here.  
This looks like a viciously regressive structure. RGA-r counts normative claims as 
justified, or valid, only if they can be based on reasons that cannot authoritatively, or 
reasonably, be rejected. But RGA-r in effect construes the reasonableness of rejections in 
terms such that 
(i) at any stage or level of deliberation, RGA-r counts rejections as reasonable 
only depending on whether they are, or can be, based on respectable reasons; 
(ii) at any stage or level of deliberation, RGA-r counts actual or possible rejection 
reasons as respectable only depending on whether there are, or can be, 
reasonable rejections of their role as such reasons.  
This is regressive since we cannot determine the reasonableness of any given, actual or 
possible rejection of φi without first determining whether there are, or can be, reasonable 
rejections of the reasons that this rejection is, or can be, based on–while RGA-r does not 
provide any additional, suitably determinate notion of the reasonableness of rejections. And 
this is vicious, in turn, because it makes us unable to identify whether normative claims are 
justified, or valid, in RGA-r‟s sense.  
 The point: if RGA-r is all that we go by, then no normative claim can be, or be known 
to be, justified, or valid. Hence, RGA-r cannot serve as a requirement of justification for 
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engaged discursive practice. Saying this does not deny that validity can be construed as a 
property that claims have, or fail to have, even if no actual agent can identify that this is so.19 
But RGA-r‟s designated role is to serve as a standard of justification, or validity, for actual 
agents in their engaged discursive practice. But RGA-r cannot serve as such a standard if no 
actual agent can identify when salient claims meet RGA-r.  
 
6. Two comments 
First, let us distinguish RGA-r‟s regressive character from its role in Forst‟s dynamic view of 
interpersonal reasoning and justification. We have seen that Forst sometimes applies RGA to 
all normative claims. He conceptualizes this in terms of a potentially open-ended process of 
inclusive and reflexive (or “recursive”) interpersonal reasoning and justification that is 
constrained by RGA and that does not exempt any subset of normative claims from this 
requirement. On this view, any one normative claim is justified, or valid, only if its putative 
justifiers meet RGA. And any one normative claim, including justifiers of other claims, can 
be called into question, or be put in need of justification, while all normative claims depend 
for their justification, or validity, on meeting RGA. And as agents are often unable to 
anticipate all relevant objections that other agents might raise, validity claims must often be 
provisional (Forst 2012, 155-87; 2017, 21-35). 
Fair enough. Validity claims are often provisional, and perhaps they are best 
construed as claims like “Given currently available relevant evidence, φ meets validity 
condition C.” But RGA-r‟s problem is not that we do not know enough to tell when claims 
meet the relevant validity condition. The problem is that we cannot know when that condition 
is met. Contrast (i) being able to identify (that is, in principle) when validity condition C is 
met and not knowing whether C is met, and (ii) being unable to identify (that is, in principle) 
when C is met and hence never knowing whether C is met. RGA-r leaves us in a situation 
like (ii). If the provisionality of validity claims in practices of reasoning and justification 
reflects (i), it might reflect a merit–e.g., the moral merit of respecting every relevant person 
as an equal co-author of justification, or the epistemic merit of open-mindedness and 
corrigibility. But if it reflects (ii), it reflects a deficiency. Discursive practices that follow 
standards that make it impossible to identify when salient claims are justified can hardly be 
practices of justification. 
For a second comment, consider a self-suggesting attempt to rescue RGA-r. If we 
build more content into it, RGA-r might not be viciously regressive. And Forst concedes that 
more content may be added to the requirement so long as this content, or adding it to RGA-r, 
“fulfil[s] the criterion of reciprocity [and generality]” (Forst 2012, 214). For the sake of 
argument, I now grant that there are predicates, α, such that building α into RGA-r allows the 
then-enriched requirement, αRGA-r, to avoid the regress problem (e.g., consider elements of 
Rawls-type reasonableness–maybe RGA-r is not regressive if it counts reasons as reasonably 
non-rejectable only if they cohere with liberal values).20 Might this help?  
One way to pick up the stick is to consider what it takes for RGA-r to constrain 
attempts to enrich RGA-r‟s content. RGA-r can be such a constraint only if the requirement is 
available in a form that allows it to do, well, relevant constraining–that is, a form that enables 
us to tell whether α, or building α into RGA-r, is reciprocally and generally acceptable. But 
the problem just is that RGA-r is not available in such a form. The regress problem arises 
because we cannot tell when anything meets the requirement. Hence, the problem that we try 
                                               
 
19 E.g., Wall‟s view of public justification construes validity in such terms. See Wall 2016, 207ff, 215-
20. 
20 See Lister 2017, 158; see also Besch 2012. 
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to remedy by adding α to RGA-r will reappear when we examine whether we may add α to 
RGA-r. By implication, claims to the effect that it is reciprocally and generally acceptable to 
build α into RGA-r would have to be stipulative, arbitrary or dogmatic.  
This conclusion is hasty. When we ask whether adding α to RGA-r is reciprocally and 
generally acceptable, we might test for either of two things: 
1.  Does adding α to RGA-r meet RGA-r? (This tests, say, simple reflexivity.) 
2.  Does adding α to RGA-r meet αRGA-r? (This tests, say, enriched 
reflexivity.) 
The problem just pointed out occurs if we answer (1): any regressive tendency in RGA-r will 
trouble us again when we examine whether adding α to RGA-r meets RGA-r. But things 
might be different if we answer (2): the then-enriched requirement might not be regressive. 
Can a test of enriched reflexivity help?  
It is not clear what kind of merit enriched reflexivity is, if any. But even if α is such 
that αRGA-r is not regressive and building α into RGA-r is reciprocally and generally 
acceptable in terms of αRGA-r, it does not follow that we may add α to RGA-r, or that 
αRGA-r may serve as a standard of justification, or validity. To see why, consider 
fundamentalist variants of reciprocity and generality–which satisfy enriched reflexivity, but 
for the wrong reasons. 
To simplify slightly: according to RGA-r, φ is justified if and only if φ can be based 
on “reasonably” non-rejectable reasons. Suppose, then, that we consider enriching RGA-r‟s 
content by defining “reasonably” non-rejectable reasons as reasons {that are non-rejectable 
for right-minded people, i.e., people who always give highest priority to True Doctrine}. Let 
the bracketed part of this sentence be a candidate predicate, α*. Our task then becomes to see 
whether building α* into RGA-r meets α*RGA-r. Presumably, this asks us to consider 
something like:  
Q1  Can the claim “φ is justified if and only if φ can be based on reasons that are 
non-rejectable from the perspective of right-minded people, i.e., people who 
always give highest priority to True Doctrine” be based on reasons that are 
non-rejectable from the perspective of right-minded people who always give 
highest priority to True Doctrine?  
Plainly, the answer to Q1 depends on the contents of True Doctrine–rather than, e.g., on what 
all affected people can or cannot accept or reject. And we may conjecture that this answer 
will be in the affirmative so long as True Doctrine is exclusionary enough so as to not require 
non-rejectability from the perspective of anyone other than people who give highest priority 
to True Doctrine. But if α*RGA-r is self-selective for this reason, this cannot recommend 
α*RGA-r, or at least not so long as we do not have prior, independent reasons to privilege the 
contents of True Doctrine.  
The upshot: even if α*RGA-r satisfies enriched reflexivity, it does not follow that 
α*RGA-r may serve as a standard of justification. That a candidate standard of justification 
satisfies enriched reflexivity does not recommend the standard unless the reason why it does 
this is meritorious. And this it might not be–as the example of fundamentalist reciprocity and 
generality illustrates. Thus: even if enriching RGA-r‟s content could render RGA-r non-
regressive, subjecting the then-enriched standard to a test of reflexivity either brings back the 
regress problem, or does not accomplish enough.21 
                                               
 
21 Note that the problem at hand is distinct from a problem of self-defeat that is often attributed to 
Rawls‟s view of public justification. The latter is a problem such that (i) Rawls‟s claim that political things of a 
14 
 
7. A duty of type-(4)-justification?  
Do we have a duty of type-(4)-justification? The above suggests No Duty (ND): 
ND  If we have a duty of type-(4)-justification, we would be under a duty to be 
able to justify ourselves, or salient claims, to others on grounds that are 
reasonably non-rejectable in RGA-r‟s sense. But as there cannot be a duty to 
comply with a viciously regressive standard, we do not have a duty to type-
(4)-justification. 
The target here is the view that we have a duty to meet RGA-r. ND does not deny that we 
have a duty of justification in any of the other senses referred to in section 4, above.  
Let me consider briefly why there is no duty to meet a viciously regressive standard 
like RGA-r. One reason (though presumably not the only one) is this: such a duty cannot be 
agent transparent, or be intelligible and adoptable22 for the agent. To simplify: when we take 
a duty like “You ought to φ” to apply to us, we normally take it not only that we can φ (in a 
salient sense of “can”), but also that we are in the position to know, or can know (in a salient 
sense of “can know”), what constitutes φing. Accordingly, if others are non-culpably unable 
to know, or come to know, what a duty prescribes–i.e., if the duty is non-culpably 
unintelligible to them–we do not take the duty to apply, or regard non-compliance not as 
blameworthy, other things being equal. This heralds that we adopt a presumption of agent 
transparency: we assume that duties and agents are such that when a duty applies to an agent, 
so that it would be blameworthy for the agent not to comply with it, then the duty is 
intelligible to the agent, other things being equal. 
However, for a duty to be agent transparent in the right way, a conception of what the 
duty prescribes must be accessible by the agent that can provide some level of orientation, or 
constrain her judgment as to what to do. E.g., Betty‟s non-compliance with “You ought to do 
the right thing!” is not blameworthy if “the right thing” is defined as “what does the trick,” 
but no information whatsoever is accessible as to what does the trick. There is still a notional 
sense in which Betty can know what the duty prescribes: she knows that what she is to bring 
about is what does the trick. But, by hypothesis, the descriptor is entirely uninformative, and 
hence Betty cannot fix its reference. But since she cannot do this, the duty does not map onto 
her choice, or constrain her judgment as to what to do. Thus, the duty is not adoptable by her. 
At the very least, then, her non-compliance is not blameworthy.  
A duty to meet RGA-r leaves us in a situation like Betty‟s, but with a twist. In a 
notional sense, RGA-r allows us to know when salient claims are valid: they are valid when 
they can be based on reasons that cannot reciprocally and generally be rejected. But as 
RGA-r is viciously regressive, we cannot get a fix on the reference of the descriptor, and so it 
does not map onto our choice. But the descriptor is not just indeterminate. Rather, it is 
amphibolic: we know that when we do fix its reference, this will involve stipulation, 
arbitrariness, or dogmatism, and hence something that is not sanctioned by RGA-r. However, 
if we cannot (permissibly) sort claims into those that this descriptor refers to and other 
claims, then we cannot (permissibly) sort claims into those that are “justified” or “valid” and 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
certain kind must be publicly justifiable itself is a political thing of that kind, but, prior to further argument, (ii) 
this claim is not publicly justifiable. See Estlund 1998, 257; Raz 1998; Besch 1998, chapter 1; Wall 2002. 
Forst‟s problem is different: we cannot know whether RGA-r fails or passes its own test in simple reflexivity; 
and if RGA-r passes its own test in enriched reflexivity, this does not accomplish enough. I am indebted to an 
anonymous reviewer for reasons to highlight this here. 
22 This follows O‟Neill. For O‟Neill, practical thought is reasoned or reasonable only if it is intelligible 
and adoptable–or followable “in thought” and “in action.” See O‟Neill 1996, 51-65 and 1988b.  
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those that are not. Thus, a duty to meet RGA-r is not agent transparent and not adoptable. But 
its failure to be these things is not owed to agent imperfection or agent limitation. RGA-r is 
viciously regressive: there is no salient level of agent perfection or agent idealization at which 
the duty becomes transparent and adoptable–or at least we, real people, are unable to identify 
whatever level this might be.  
 
8. What does this call for? 
This leaves us with many possibilities. The core of the problem at hand is not (i) the view that 
relevant claims must be reciprocally and generally acceptable, or (ii) that this requirement 
must be understood in terms of RGA-r, or (iii) that RGA-r must pass its own test. The core of 
the problem is that RGA-r understands reasonableness in terms of F2. We may be able to 
avoid this problem and endorse (i)–(iii) if RGA-r understands reasonableness in different 
terms. This casts the door open for other ideas of the reasonable. What idea of reasonableness 
(if any) may reciprocal and general justifications draw on?  
 Let me elaborate on a particularly vexing aspect of this matter–one that goes to the 
heart of the (putative) emancipatory or protective function of reciprocal and general 
justification. We saw earlier that in order to serve this function, justification practice must 
accord agents a relevant measure of discursive influence in justification, or on its outcomes. 
Forst tries to capture this by claiming that reciprocal and general justification accords people 
qualified veto-rights. But allocating such rights per se means little unless people can use them 
to exert a relevant level or measure of discursive influence. But what level is that? And what 
else must be true of justification practice for people to be able to make meaningful use of 
their veto-rights?  
If reciprocal and general justification defines its bar for authoritativeness in terms that 
are high in idealization value, people can be left with little discursive influence. E.g., if it 
recognizes Paul‟s rejection of φ as a suitably qualified, authoritative exercise of a discursive 
veto-right only if Paul‟s rejection of φ instantiates ideal levels of (epistemic or moral) 
reasonableness, actual Paul, given his actual limitations, might be unable to authoritatively 
exercise his veto-right. But if his rejection of φ needs only to instantiate average levels of 
reasonableness, Paul might be able to authoritatively exercise his veto-right and make 
protective or emancipatory use of it. The point: reciprocal and general justification can serve 
an emancipatory or protective function only if a relevant bar for authoritativeness is set low 
enough to make it a readily accessible option for people to authoritatively reject views that 
they are actually committed to reject.23  
But this leaves us in a tight spot. If we construe reciprocal and general acceptability in 
RGA-r‟s reasonable non-rejectability terms and set RGA-r‟s bar for reasonableness low 
enough so that relevant people, or their rejections, can meet that bar, then we bend RGA-r in 
an actualist direction. Now reciprocal and general justification must also model discursive 
equality: it aspires to treat all affected agents as equal authorities of justification. But the 
lower RGA-r‟s bar for reasonableness is set relative to the deliberative resources of actual 
people, the less will the resulting, actualist form of reciprocal and general justification be able 
to avoid incoherence or anomy results of the sort that disqualified RGA-a (see section 3).24 
The upshot: if RGA-r is to serve as a standard of justification–rather than a non-justificatory 
constraint on public will-formation–the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal 
and general justification sit uneasily with its egalitarian commitments.  
                                               
 
23 On the relationship between idealization and discursive influence: see fn. 8, above, and Besch 2019b.  
24 This problem is not distinctive for Forst‟s RGA. For an account of the problem in Rawls‟s political 
liberalism: see Enoch 2015.  
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This is not the place to explore how reciprocal and general justification might 
construe discursive equality to reconcile it with its emancipatory or protective commitments 
(I do so elsewhere).25 But it is plain that this reconciliation task is of the essence where a 
conception of justification sets itself the task to work out the idea of a “social order that is 
both historically possible and normatively justified” (Forst 2017a, 1) and that accords to each 
relevant person a share of the power of justification, or meaningful rejection rights that (help 
to) protect them from “unjustified domination” (Forst 2001, 168f).  
This reconciliation task calls for considerations beyond RGA-r‟s purview. It calls for 
a calibration of RGA-r‟s bar for authoritativeness, which is part of what determines RGA-r‟s 
meaning and normativity. And this task is substantive. Amongst other things, this calibration 
must be done in light of some view of the importance of an agent‟s having, or being accorded 
by others, discursive influence. It calls for a comparison of the merits of candidate allocations 
of such influence across relevant constituencies. And it must be done in light of a view about 
how the respective merits of such allocations measure up against other goals or values that 
justification practice stands to serve. Thus, what level of discursive influence in justification 
should relevant agents be able to exercise? What level is needed, or desirable? And if unequal 
allocations of discursive influence are unavoidable, when are they permissible, or just?26   
Unless such questions can plausibly be answered, we do not know how RGA-r‟s bar 
for authoritativeness may be calibrated. And if we do not know this, we do not know whether 
the fact that φ meets RGA-r confers authority on φ. After all, it cannot both be true (i) that φ 
is justified in virtue of meeting a (putative) standard of acceptability-based justification such 
as RGA-r and (ii) that this standard impermissibly allocates discursive influence. Thus, the 
substantive questions just referred to are more fundamental in the order of justification than 
RGA-r, or (putative) justifications by this standard. 
 
9. Conclusion 
I examined Forst‟s view of reciprocal and general acceptability with a focus on reciprocity of 
reasons. On an initially promising reading, RGA calls for reasonable non-rejectability. RGA-
r might avoid incoherence or anomy results, and it is not incompatible with the desiderata of 
accessibility and authenticity. But even setting aside doubts as to whether a reasonably non-
rejectable duty of justification can take the form of a duty to type-(4)-justification, Forst‟s 
conception of reciprocity of reasons fails. RGA-r is viciously regressive. And a duty of 
justification to meet RGA-r is not agent transparent and adoptable. The upshot: perhaps there 
are standards of justification, or validity, such that if discursive practice complies with them, 
such practice serves salient emancipatory or protective aims. But RGA-r does not seem to be 
one of these standards.  
 To salvage RGA-r and the idea of a duty to justification, we must re-interpret these 
things in light of an idea of the reasonable that we may adopt. Accordingly, we have reasons 
to construe of RGA-r‟s normative content itself as something that calls for justification. Thus, 
we should downgrade RGA-r in the order of justification and calibrate RGA-r, or its content, 
                                               
 
25 See Besch 2019a, b. 
26 To explore these issues further, Besch 2019a considers views of the permissibility of purchase 
inequality, or conceptions of purchase justice, while Besch 2019b argues that justification practice should set the 
idealization value of its bar for authoritativeness low enough to make it a genuinely available option for relevant 
people to reject salient claims in ways that, within that practice, count as authoritative. This caps the idealization 
value of standards of justification and it defines a minimum level of discursive purchase. Where justification 
practice meets this standard, it recognizes relevant people as “self-authenticating sources of valid claims” 
(Rawls 2001, 23) and allocates them the recognitive discursive minimum (Besch 2019b). I am indebted to an 
anonymous reviewer for reasons to highlight this here. 
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in light of substantive views about the measure or level of discursive influence that relevant 
people should be able to exercise in justification, given salient emancipatory and egalitarian 
commitments.  
 It is not clear what this call for and whether it can be accomplished in terms that are 
widely shareable by relevant agents. But it is clear that this matter must be addressed to 
salvage RGA-r and the view that we have a duty of justification to meet this requirement. 
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